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Abstract
We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of
moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and
Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three funda-
mental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fair-
ness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most im-
portant efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which
ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We
also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the
optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving
from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes
these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For ex-
ample, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a
single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anony-
mous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mecha-
nisms on the line exist with all three properties. We also show
that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two
(or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are min-
imal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto
optimality or strategy proofness)multiplemechanisms satisfy
the other two axioms.
Introduction
The facility location problem captures many real world
problems such as locating hospitals, telephone exchanges,
ambulances, post offices or playgrounds. Beyond geo-
graphical domains, there are a range of other real world
problems modeled by facility location problems such as
choosing tax-rates, room temperatures, or members of a
committee. The facility location problem has attracted
researchers from a range of areas including AI, operations
research and social choice (e.g. (Drezner and Hamacher
2002; Escoffier et al. 2011; Procaccia and Tennenholtz
2013; Feigenbaum and Sethuraman 2015;
Golowich, Narasimhan, and Parkes 2018)). Our goal
here is to design strategy proof mechanisms that elicit the
true locations of a set of agents and use this information to
locate one or more facilities to serve the agents fairly and
efficiently. In particular, we look to minimize the total or
maximum distance of the agents from the facility serving
them. These are respectively an utilitarian or egalitarian
welfare objective.
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In previous work on mechanism design for facility lo-
cation problems, researchers have often limited their atten-
tion to the one dimensional problem, locating facilities on a
line (e.g. (Procaccia and Tennenholtz 2013)). This captures
a number of real world settings such as locating distribution
centres along a motorway, or sewage plants along a river.
However, many real world problems have two (or more) di-
mensions, and use metrics such as Euclidean or Manhattan
distances. This focus on one dimensional problems has been
justified as a starting point to consider more complex set-
tings (e.g., trees and networks), and as it may provide insight
into these more complex settings (e.g. lower bounds for 1-
d problem are inherited by 2-d problem). Our contribution
here is to suggest caution in such arguments. We show, for
example, that many Pareto optimal and strategy proof mech-
anisms do not lift from 1-d to 2-d space. The extra freedom
provided by an additional dimension can make it harder to
achieve desirable axiomatic properties like Pareto optimality
and strategy proofness.
Formal Background
We have n agents located in 2-d space, and want to
locate m facilities to serve all n agents. Agent i is
at location (xi, yi). Distances are either Euclidean or
Manhattan: d((x, y), (u, v)) =
√
(x− u)2 + (y − v)2 or
d((x, y), (u, v)) = |x − u| + |y − v|. The extension of
the problem to higher dimensions is straightforward, while
the restriction to 1-d space simply requires setting all y-
coordinates to zero. In this case, we suppose agents are
ordered so that x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xn. An agent is served by
the nearest facility, and a solution is a location (uj , vj)
for each facility j. We let ai ∈ [1,m] be the facility
serving agent i. We consider an utilitarian welfare objec-
tive of the total distance,
∑n
i=1 d((xi, yi), (uai , vai)) and
an egalitarian welfare objective of the maximum distance,
maxni=1d((xi, yi), (uai , vai)). The goal is to locate facilities
to minimize one of these two distances.
We consider a number of mechanisms for the facility lo-
cation problem. Given a fixed order over the agents, the SD
mechanism is a serial dictatorship that allocates the first fa-
cility to the location of the first agent, and subsequent fa-
cilities to the next agent in order at a new location. In the
1-d problem, the PERCENTILE mechanism is a family of
mechanisms with parameters p1 to pm that locate facility
j at x1+⌊pj(n−1)⌋ for j ∈ [1,m]. For instance, with m = 1,
the LEFTMOST mechanism has p1 = 0, the MEDIAN mech-
anism has p1 =
1
2 , and the RIGHTMOST mechanism has
p1 = 1. And, with m = 2, the ENDPOINT mechanism,
which locates facilities at the left and rightmost agents, has
p1 = 0 and p2 = 1. The d-dimensional PERCENTILE
mechanism picks an orthogonal set of d axes and applies
a PERCENTILE mechanism to each axis. For example, the
2-dimensional MEDIAN mechanism picks an orthogonal set
of axes, and applies the MEDIAN mechanism to each axis.
In many facility location problems, facilities may
also have capacity constraints (e.g. (Brimberg et al. 2001;
Aziz et al. 2019, 2020)). A telephone exchange can connect
at most a fixed number of houses, a kindergarten has places
for only a given number of children, a doctor’s practice can
serve just a limited number of patients, etc. Therefore, we
also consider an extension of the facility location problem
that includes capacity constraints. This extension was previ-
ously studied in (Aziz et al. 2019, 2020). In this capacitated
setting, the jth facility can serve up to cj agents. We assume
that n ≤ ∑mj=1 ci so that every agent can be served. One
special setting we consider is when there is no spare capac-
ity (i.e.
∑m
j=1 cj = n). Another special setting we consider
is when facilities are identical (i.e. ci = cj for all i < j).
A solution in the capacitated setting is now both a location
(uj , vj) for each facility j, and an assignment of agents to
facilities such that the capacity constraint on each facility is
not exceeded. Agents no longer have to be served by their
nearest facility. Let Nj denote the set of agents assigned to
facility j, i.e., Nj = {i|ai = j}. Then the capacity con-
straints ensure |Nj| ≤ cj for all j ∈ [1,m]. The goal in the
capacitated setting is to locate facilities and assign agents to
facilities to minimize either the total or maximum distance.
We consider three desirable axiomatic properties of mech-
anisms for facility location: anonymity, strategy proofness
and Pareto optimality. Anonymity is a simple but fundamen-
tal fairness property that requires all agents to be treated
the same. Pareto optimality is a simple efficiency property
that is one of the most fundamental normative properties in
the whole of economics. It demands that we cannot make
one agent better off without making other agents worse off.
Finally, strategy proofness is a fundamental game theoretic
property that ensures there is no incentive for agents to act
strategically by mis-reporting their location.
More formally, a mechanism is anonymous iff permuting
the agents does not change the solution. It is not hard to
see that the SD mechanism is not anonymous, but that any
PERCENTILE mechanism is. A mechanism is Pareto opti-
mal iff it returns solutions that are always Pareto optimal.
A solution is Pareto optimal iff there is no other solution in
which one agent travels a strictly shorter distance, and every
other agent travels the same or shorter distance to the facility
serving them. For example, the SD mechanism is Pareto op-
timal. A mechanism is strategy proof iff agents cannot im-
prove the solution by mis-reporting their location (i.e. no
agent can mis-report and reduce the distance to travel to
the facility serving them). For example, the d-dimensional
PERCENTILE mechanism is strategy proof with any param-
eters (Theorem 3 in (Sui, Boutilier, and Sandholm 2013)).
Finally, we will consider how well a mechanism approx-
imates the optimal possible welfare. A mechanism achieves
an approximation ratio ρ for the total (maximum) distance iff
the total (maximum) distance in any solution it returns is at
most ρ times the optimal. In this case, we say that the mecha-
nism ρ-approximates the optimal total (maximum) distance.
For example, in 1-d space, any PERCENTILE mechanism
such as the LEFTMOST mechanism 2-approximates the op-
timal maximum distance (Procaccia and Tennenholtz 2013).
One Facility in Euclidean Space
We begin with one of the simplest possible settings: a single
uncapacitated facility in Euclidean space. This is a setting
in which several insightful results are already known about
strategy proof mechanisms.
Anonymity and Pareto Optimality
With an odd number of agents, a mechanism for locat-
ing a single facility in 2-dimensional Euclidean space is
anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof iff it is a 2-
dimensional MEDIAN mechanism (Peters et al. 1992). For
two dimensions and an even number of agents, or for three
or more dimensions and an odd or even number of agents, no
mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof
(Peters et al. 1992).
We can consider dropping in turn anonymity, Pareto opti-
mality and strategy proofness. If we drop anonymity, there
are multiplemechanisms for Euclidean space that are Pareto
optimal and strategy proof. For instance, any SD mecha-
nism is Pareto optimal and strategy proof but not anony-
mous. Similarly, if we drop Pareto optimality, there are
multiple mechanisms for Euclidean space that are anony-
mous and strategy proof but not Pareto optimal. For in-
stance, the 2-dimensional LEFTMOST and the 2-dimensional
RIGHTMOST mechanisms are both anonymous and strat-
egy proof, but not Pareto optimal. Finally, if we drop strat-
egy proofness, there are multiple mechanisms for Euclidean
space that are anonymous and Pareto optimal but not strat-
egy proof. For instance, consider a mechanism that locates
the facility at the location of the agent with smallest x co-
ordinate, tie-breaking by the smallest y coordinate. This
mechanism is anonymous and Pareto optimal but not strat-
egy proof. We conclude therefore that, with an odd number
of agents in Euclidean space, anonymity, Pareto optimality
and strategy proofness are a minimal combination of axioms
characterizing the 2-dimensional MEDIAN mechanism.
Total Distance
With a single facility in Euclidean space, the total distance
is minimized by locating the facility at the geometric me-
dian. A mechanism locating a single facility at the geomet-
ric median is anonymous and Pareto optimal, but not strat-
egy proof (Goel and Hann-Caruthers 2020). Consider, for
instance, agents at (0, 0), (0, 2), (12, 0) and (12, 2). The
agent at (12, 0) has an incentive to mis-report their loca-
tion as (12, 2) to move the geometric median from (6, 1)
to (12, 2) which is nearer to (12, 0). Thus, a strategy proof
mechanism in Euclidean space cannot always locate a single
facility so as to minimize the total distance. We contrast this
with the 1-d case where the MEDIAN mechanism is strategy
proof and returns the optimal total distance.
As in (Procaccia and Tennenholtz 2013), we might ask:
since a strategy proof mechanism in Euclidean space can-
not be optimal with respect to the total distance, how well
can it approximate the optimal total distance?We prove next
that no strategy proof mechanism can be better than an α-
approximation for some α strictly greater than 1.
Theorem 1 In Euclidean space, there exists an α > 1 such
that no deterministic and strategy proof mechanism for lo-
cating a single facility is an α-approximation or better of
the optimal total distance.
Proof: Assume the opposite. For any α > 1, there ex-
ists a deterministic and strategy proof mechanism that is
an α-approximation of the optimal total distance. Consider
four agents at (0, 0), (0, 2), (12, 0) and (12, 2). The optimal
placement of the facility is at the geometric median: (6, 1).
The total distance of the four agents from the geometric me-
dian is 4
√
37. Suppose the facility moves one unit distance
from the geometric median. Then the total distances of the
agents from the facility increases to at least 2(
√
50 +
√
26).
This smallest total distance occurs when the facility is at
(5, 1) or (7, 1). The ratio between these two total distances
is
√
50+
√
26
2
√
37
. This is strictly between 1.0003 and 1.0004. Set
α = 1.0003. Then the mechanism must locate the facility
within one unit of distance from the geometric median, and
a distance of over five units from (12, 0).
Suppose now the agent at (12, 0) mis-reports their loca-
tion as (12, 2). The geometric median moves to (12, 2). The
total distance of the reported positions of the four agents
from (12, 2) is 12 + 2
√
37 which is approximately 24.166.
If the mechanism locates the facility more than two units
distance from (12, 2) then algebraic reasoning shows that
the total distance of the facility from the reported posi-
tions of the agents increases from 12 + 2
√
37 to more than
24.18. The ratio between these total distances is greater than
1.0005. Hence, if the mechanism is an α-approximation for
α = 1.0003, then the facility must be located less than two
units distance from (12, 2). But the facility in this case is
strictly less than four units distance from (12, 0). Hence the
agent at (12, 0) has an incentive to mis-report their location
as (12, 2). This contradicts the assumption that the mecha-
nism is strategy proof. Therefore the initial assumption that
it is an α-approximation for α = 1.0003must be false. ⋄
This result shows that there is a lower bound on
the approximation ratio of any deterministic and strategy
proof mechanism in Euclidean space. It leaves open how
large this approximation ratio must be. For an odd num-
ber of agents and 2-dimensional Euclidean space, the 2-
dimensional MEDIAN mechanism provides an upper bound
on the best possible approximation ratio for the total dis-
tance. In particular, the 2-dimensional MEDIAN mechanism
returns an
√
2
√
n2+1
n+1 -approximation of the optimal total dis-
tance (Goel and Hann-Caruthers 2020). By letting n tend to
infinity, we conclude that α ≤ √2. We contrast this with
the 1-d setting in which the MEDIAN mechanism is always
strategy proof and optimal, locating the facility to minimize
the total distance.
Maximum Distance
In Euclidean space, bounds on the performance of strategy
proof mechanisms in computing the optimal maximum dis-
tance are less well studied. It is again easy to see that no
strategy proof mechanism can return the optimal solution.
For instance, the ONECENTRE mechanism, which locates
the facility at the centre of the smallest enclosing circle, re-
turns an optimal solution for agents on the Euclidean plane.
The smallest enclosing circle can be found in linear time
(Megiddo 1982). While this mechanism is anonymous and
Pareto optimal, it is not strategy proof. Consider, for in-
stance, two agents at (0, 0) and one at (0, 1). The rightmost
agent can mis-report their location as (0, 2) to achieve a bet-
ter outcome. In fact, it follows from the 1-d setting (Theo-
rem 3.2 of (Procaccia and Tennenholtz 2013)), that no de-
terministic and strategy proof mechanism can do better than
2-approximate the optimal maximum distance in Euclidean
space.
With an odd number of agents on the Euclidean plane,
the only mechanism that is anonymous, Pareto optimal and
strategy proof is the 2-dimensional MEDIAN mechanism
(Peters et al. 1992). We now prove that this mechanism 2-
approximates the optimal maximum distance. To show this,
we need a lemma that this mechanism locates the facility on
or within the smallest enclosing circle. To ensure the me-
dian is unambiguously defined and the mechanism is strat-
egy proof, we restrict ourselves to an odd number of agents.
Lemma 1 With 2-dimensional Euclidean space and an odd
number of agents, the 2-dimensional MEDIAN mechanism
locates the facility on the circumference of or within the
smallest enclosing circle.
Proof: Suppose that there are 2k + 1 agents, the facility is
at (x, y), and the centre of the smallest enclosing circle is
(x′, y′). There are two cases. In the first, x ≥ x′. Let the
circumference of the smallest enclosing circle go through
(x, y′ + c) and (x, y′ − c). There are therefore k + 1 agents
with x coordinates greater than or equal to x. These k + 1
agents have a y coordinate that is smaller than or equal to
y′ + c as they are on or within the smallest enclosing circle.
The median y coordinate of the agents cannot then be larger
than y′ + c. By a similar argument, the median y coordinate
of the agents cannot also be smaller than y′ − c. Hence, the
facility lies on or within the smallest enclosing circle. In the
second case, x ≤ x′. This case is symmetric to the first. ⋄
Theorem 2 With 2-dimensional Euclidean space and an
odd number of agents, the 2-dimensional MEDIAN mech-
anism 2-approximates the optimal maximum distance.
Proof: By the previous lemma, the facility is located on or
within the smallest enclosing circle. The worst case is when
the facility is located on the circumference of this circle and
there is an agent diametrically opposite. In this case, this
agent is twice the optimal maximum distance away from the
facility. ⋄
It follows that the 2-dimensional MEDIAN mechanism
is optimal in terms of strategy proof mechanisms for ap-
proximating the optimal maximum distance. No determin-
istic and strategy proof mechanism has a better approxima-
tion ratio even when restricted to the line (Theorem 3.2 of
(Procaccia and Tennenholtz 2013)). With an odd number of
agents and a single facility, moving from the 1-d to the 2-
d setting changes little. The MEDIAN mechanism on the
line achieves the same (and optimal) 2-approximation of the
maximum distance as the 2-dimensional MEDIAN mecha-
nism does on the Euclidean plane.
Multiple Facilities in Euclidean Space
We next consider strategy proof mechanisms for locating
two or more uncapacitated facilities in Euclidean space.
There is less known about this setting than about two or
more facilities in one dimensional Euclidean space, or about
a single facility in an Euclidean space of two or more di-
mensions. Our results here are somewhat negative. We first
prove a strong impossibility theorem: when locating two
or more facilities in Euclidean space, we cannot simulta-
neously achieve anonymity, Pareto optimality and strategy
proofness.
Theorem 3 With m uncapacitated facilities (m ≥ 2), n
agents (n ≥ m + 3) and Euclidean space with two or more
dimensions, no mechanism for facility location is anony-
mous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof.
Proof: We consider just two dimensional Euclidean space.
The proof for three or more dimensions merely needs to re-
strict agents to a plane. Suppose we have 2 facilities and n
agents with n ≥ 5. Either n = 2k + 2 or n = 2k + 1. Put
2k agents at (0, 0) and the remaining n− 2k agents (which
is one or two at most) at (100, 100). The unique Pareto opti-
mal mechanism locates the facilities at (0, 0) and (100, 100)
serving the agents at each location. Suppose the agents at
(100, 100) are fixed but those at (0, 0) are allowed to move
in the box bounded between (0, 0) and (1, 1). Then essen-
tially we have a single facility location problem on the re-
maining 2k agents that locates the leftmost facility some-
where in the convex hull of the reported locations of the 2k
agents. Theorem 4.1 in (Peters et al. 1992) demonstrates that
no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy
proof for an even number of agents in two dimensional Eu-
clidean space. This proof continues to hold if the locations of
the agents are limited to a small box such as between (0, 0)
and (1, 1). Note that an agent cannot profitably mis-report
their location as (100, 100). To ensure anonymity and Pareto
optimality, the mechanism must then locate both facilities at
(100, 100) which puts the nearest facility surely at a greater
distance. A sincere report puts the facility within the convex
hull of the leftmost 2k agents which is nearer to their loca-
tion than (100, 100). Hence, there is no mechanism that is
anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof for two facil-
ities in the Euclidean plane. Form facilities withm > 2, we
place an additional agent at (100j, 100j) for j = 3 tom. ⋄
We contrast this impossibility result with the 1-d set-
ting where anonymity, Pareto optimality, strategy proof-
ness and good approximation ratios are all simultane-
ously achievable. In particular, when locating two facil-
ities on the line, the ENDPOINT mechanism is anony-
mous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof, and has good ap-
proximation ratios for the total and maximum distances
(Procaccia and Tennenholtz 2013). It is somewhat disap-
pointing then that, when we move from two facilities in 1-
d Euclidean space to two facilities in 2-d Euclidean space,
we can no longer simultaneously achieve these desirable ax-
iomatic properties.
We also contrast this impossibility result with the setting
of a single facility in the Euclidean plane where anonymity,
Pareto optimality, strategy proofness and good approxima-
tion ratios are again all simultaneously achievable provided
we have an odd number of agents. In particular, the two-
dimensional MEDIAN mechanism satisfies all these desir-
able axiomatic properties. Note that Theorem 3 continues to
hold in the Euclidean plane with just an odd (or just an even)
number of agents. It is again somewhat disappointing then
that, when we move from one facility in the Euclidean plane
to two facilities in the Euclidean plane, we can no longer si-
multaneously achieve these desirable axiomatic properties.
We next consider dropping in turn anonymity, Pareto op-
timality and strategy proofness. If we drop anonymity, there
are multiple mechanisms for locating two or more facilities
in Euclidean space that are Pareto optimal and strategy proof
but not anonymous. For example, any SD mechanism is
Pareto optimal and strategy proof but not anonymous. Simi-
larly, if we drop Pareto optimality, there are multiplemecha-
nisms that are anonymous and strategy proof but not Pareto
optimal (e.g. any multi-dimensional PERCENTILE mecha-
nism with parameters pi = pj for all i and j). And if we
drop strategy proofness, there are multiple mechanisms that
are anonymous and Pareto optimal but not strategy proof.
Consider, for example, the mechanism that picks some or-
thogonal set of coordinate axes, then orders agents by x-
coordinate, tie-breaking by y-coordinate, and locates the
first facility at the position of the first agent in this order,
and subsequent facilities at the position of the next agent
in the order at a new location. We therefore conclude that
anonymity, Pareto optimality and strategy proofness are a
minimal combination of incompatible axioms for locating
two or more facilities in Euclidean space.
Welfare Bounds
We now consider how well strategy proof mechanisms can
approximate the optimal welfare when locating multiple fa-
cilities in Euclidean space. For instance, can we bound the
approximation ratio for the maximum or total distance?
When locating two facilities on the line, the only
deterministic, anonymous and strategy proof mechanism
with a bounded approximation ratio for the total dis-
tance is the ENDPOINT mechanism (Theorem 3.1 in
(Fotakis and Tzamos 2013)). Recall that the ENDPOINT
mechanism is an instance of the PERCENTILE mechanism
with m = 2, p1 = 0 and p2 = 1. The ENDPOINT mecha-
nism also provides a 2-approximation of the optimal maxi-
mum distance. Again, this is optimal as no deterministic and
strategy proof mechanism can have a better approximation
ratio (Corollary 4.4 of (Procaccia and Tennenholtz 2013)).
In fact, the ENDPOINT mechanism is not just optimal in
terms of the approximation ratio of the maximumdistance. It
is the only PERCENTILE mechanism for locating two unca-
pacitated facilities on the line with a bounded approximation
ratio for the maximum distance (Anonymous 2021).
We therefore consider next welfare bounds for multi-
dimensional PERCENTILE mechanism when locating two or
more facilities in Euclidean space. It is known that in Eu-
clidean space the multi-dimensional PERCENTILE mecha-
nism for two or more uncapacitated facilities has an un-
bounded approximation ratio for the total distance (Theo-
rem 4 in (Sui, Boutilier, and Sandholm 2013)). Can we do
better in approximating the maximum distance? This is cer-
tainly the case in 1-dimension where we can approximate
the maximum distance better than the total distance. Specif-
ically, with any mechanism on the line that is determinis-
tic and strategy proof, the optimal approximation ratio for
the total distance is n− 2, but for the maximum distance is
just 2 (Fotakis and Tzamos 2013). We prove next that, in Eu-
clidean space, multi-dimensional PERCENTILE mechanisms
cannot do better at approximating the maximum distance
than they can at approximating the total distance.
Theorem 4 No multi-dimensional PERCENTILE mecha-
nism for two (or more) facilities in two (or more) dimen-
sional Euclidean space bounds the approximation ratio for
the maximum distance.
Proof: The maximum distance, dmax is lower bounded
by the following identity relating it to dtotal, the to-
tal distance: dmax ≥ dtotaln . Hence, if the total dis-
tance is unbounded (as demonstrated by Theorem 4 in
(Sui, Boutilier, and Sandholm 2013), then the maximum
distance is too. Rather than call upon this identity, we will
give an explicit proof that the approximation ratio for the
maximum distance is unbounded since the proof provides
insight into why the approximation ratio can be unbounded,
and how the PERCENTILE mechanism can go wrong. Note
that each case in this proof is also an example of how
PERCENTILE mechanisms do not bound the approximation
ratio for the total distance.
We consider two facilities in two dimensions. The proof
easily generalizes to more facilities and more dimensions.
There are three cases. In the first case, neither of the two
facilities is at a location corresponding to parameters (1, 1).
That is, neither of the two facilities is at (xmax, ymax)where
xmax and ymax are the maximum reported x and y coordi-
nates. Let pmax be the largest parameter less than 1, and
n = ⌈ 31−pmax ⌉. Consider n − 1 agents at (0, 0) and one at
(1, 1). The optimal maximum distance is zero with a facil-
ity at (0, 0) and one at (1, 1). However, the PERCENTILE
mechanism returns a solution with both facilities at (0, 0),
and maximum distance of
√
2. In the second case, one of
the facilities is at a location corresponding to parameters
(1, 1) and the other is at a location corresponding to (p1, p2)
where at least one pi is non-zero. Let pmax be the maximum
of p1 and p2, and n = ⌈ 3pmax ⌉. Consider n − 1 agents at
(1, 1) and one at (0, 0). The optimal maximum distance is
zero with a facility at (0, 0) and one at (1, 1). However, the
PERCENTILE mechanism returns a solution with one facil-
ity at (1, 1), and the other not at (0, 0). This solution has a
maximum distance of
√
2. In the third case, one of the facil-
ities is at a location corresponding to parameters (0, 0) and
the other is at a location corresponding to parameters (1, 1).
Consider one agent at (0, 1) and the other at (1, 0). The opti-
mal maximum distance is zero with a facility at each agent,
but the PERCENTILE mechanism returns a solution with a
maximum distance of 1. ⋄
Capacitated Facilities
We next consider the impact of capacity constraints on fa-
cility location in Euclidean space. We might hope to design
mechanisms with stronger axiomatic properties in the ca-
pacitated setting than the uncapacitated setting for at least
two reasons. The first reason is that adding capacity lim-
its requires us to allocate agents to particular facilities, and
this may reduce the opportunity for agents to be strategic.
For example, in a general metric space, the randomized
PROPORTIONAL mechanism is not strategy proof with three
or more agents but becomes so when we make it winner im-
posing (Fotakis and Tzamos 2010).
A second reason we might do better in the capacitated set-
ting in Euclidean space is that, with multiple uncapacitated
facilities, irrespective of whether the total number of agents
is even or odd, one facility might need to serve an even
number of agents, and no mechanism in Euclidean space is
anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof with an even
number of agents (Peters et al. 1992). On the other hand,
in the capacitated setting, we can limit ourselves to situa-
tions in which the capacity of each facility is an odd num-
ber. Recall that in the Euclidean plane with an odd number
of agents, there exists an unique mechanism to locate a sin-
gle uncapacitated facility that is anonymous, Pareto optimal
and strategy proof (Peters et al. 1992).
Unfortunately, this hope is not realized. We prove an-
other strong impossibility theorem: no mechanism for locat-
ing two or more capacitated facilities in Euclidean space can
simultaneously be anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy
proof even limited to facilities with an odd capacity.
Theorem 5 With two or more facilities of capacity 3 or
larger and Euclidean space with two or more dimensions, no
mechanism for capacitated facility location is anonymous,
Pareto optimal and strategy proof.
Proof: Suppose that such a mechanism exist. We can as-
sume that the facilities have the same size and that none of
their capacity is spare since there is already no mechanism
that is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof in the
one dimensional setting when either we have two facilities
with two or more different sizes, or we have spare capacity
(Anonymous 2021). We consider also just two dimensional
Euclidean space. The proof for three or more dimensions
merely needs to restrict agents to a two dimensional plane.
We suppose that we have two facilities of capacity c.
There are two cases. If c is even, say c = 2k with k > 1,
we consider 2k agents in the box between (0, 0) and (1, 1),
and another 2k agents at (100, 100). Any anonymous and
Pareto optimal mechanism locates one facility at (100, 100)
serving the agents at this location, and the other in the box
between (0, 0) and (1, 1). Suppose the agents at (100, 100)
are fixed. Then essentially we have a single facility lo-
cation problem on the remaining 2k agents. Theorem 4.1
in (Peters et al. 1992) demonstrates that no mechanism is
anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof for an even
number of agents in two dimensional Euclidean space. This
proof continues to hold if the agents are limited to a small
box such as between (0, 0) and (1, 1). Note that an agent
cannot profitably mis-report their location as (100, 100).
To ensure anonymity and Pareto optimality, the mechanism
must then locate both facilities at (100, 100) which puts the
facility serving this agent at a greater distance. A sincere
report locates the facility within the convex hull of the left-
most 2k agents which is nearer to their true location than
(100, 100). Hence, there is no mechanism for two facilities
with even capacity in the Euclidean plane that is anonymous,
and Pareto optimal and strategy proof.
If c is odd, say c = 2k+1 with k ≥ 1, we consider 2k+1
agents at (0, 0), and another 2k + 1 agents at (100, 100).
Any anonymous and Pareto optimal mechanism locates one
facility at (0, 0) and the other at (100, 100). Suppose the
agents at (100, 100) are fixed. Then essentially we have a
single facility location problem on the remaining 2k + 1
agents. Theorem 3.1 in (Peters et al. 1992) demonstrates that
any mechanism in this setting that is anonymous, Pareto op-
timal and strategy proof is a multi-dimensional MEDIAN
mechanism. Whatever orthogonal coordinate axes we take,
this puts the leftmost facility at (0, 0). Suppose one agent
at (0, 0) is moved along the diagonal towards the 2k + 1
agents at (100, 100). The two facilities remain immobile at
(0, 0) and (100, 100). Consider now the agent arriving at
(100, 100). By anonymity over the 2k + 2 agents now at
(100, 100) and Pareto optimality, both facilities must be at
(100, 100). This contradicts the leftmost facility remaining
at (0, 0). This contradiction means that our initial assump-
tion, that an anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof
mechanism exists, is false. Form facilities with m > 2, we
consider an additional (m− 2)c agents at (200, 200). ⋄
An interesting open case is four agents and two identi-
cal facilities with no space capacity. Is there an anonymous,
Pareto optimal and strategy proof mechanism for this set-
ting?
We contrast this last impossibility result with the 1-d set-
ting. For facility location on the line, anonymity, Pareto
optimality and strategy proofness can simultaneously be
achieved. In particular, with two identical and capacitated
facilities on the line, provided there is no spare capacity, the
INNERPOINT mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and
strategy proof and has good approximation ratios for the to-
tal and maximum distance (Aziz et al. 2020).
Finally, we consider dropping in turn anonymity, Pareto
optimality and strategy proofness. By similar arguments to
case of strategy proof mechanisms for locating multiple un-
capacitated facilities in Euclidean space, we can show that
there are multiple mechanisms satisfying just two of these
axioms. It follows then that anonymity, Pareto optimality
and strategy proofness are a minimal combination of incom-
patible axioms for locating two or more capacitated facilities
in two or more dimensional Euclidean space.
Manhattan distances
We conclude by switching from Euclidean to Manhattan
distances. We might hope to achieve stronger axiomatic
properties with Manhattan distances as these are somewhat
“closer” to the one dimensional setting, and strategy proof
mechanisms are somewhat “easier” to construct on the line.
Unfortunately, this is not the case.
For a single facility on the line, any mechanism that is
anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof is a gener-
alized median mechanism (Moulin 1980). Barbera et al.
(Barber, Gul, and Stacchetti 1993) lifted this result to Man-
hattan distances in two or more dimensions. In particular,
they prove that any strategy proof mechanism on m di-
mensions can be decomposed coordinate wise into strategy
proof mechanisms that act on the m coordinates individu-
ally. What if we additionally demand Pareto optimality? We
prove a strong characterization result: with Manhattan dis-
tances and two or more dimensions, mechanisms can only
be anonymous, strategy proof and Pareto optimal iff there
are three or fewer agents.
Theorem 6 For three or fewer agents in two or more di-
mensions, there exist anonymous, strategy proof and Pareto
optimal mechanisms for locating a single facility with Man-
hattan distances.
Proof: For a single agent, we locate the facility at the agent.
For two agents, consider a mechanismwhich sets each co-
ordinate of the facility to be the max (or the min) of the two
reported coordinates of the two agents. This mechanism is
anonymous and strategy proof. To show Pareto optimality,
there are two cases. Either the facility is at the location of
one of the agents which is clearly Pareto optimal, or it is at an
empty vertex of the bounding hypercube around the two fa-
cilities. Moving along one coordinate direction towards one
agent reduces the Manhattan distance to this agent, but in-
creases the Manhattan distance to the other agent. Hence,
the solution is Pareto optimal.
For three agents, consider a mechanism which sets each
coordinate to be the median of the three reported coordinates
of the three agents. This mechanism is anonymous and strat-
egy proof. To show Pareto optimality, there are two cases.
Either the facility is at the location of one of the agents which
is clearly Pareto optimal. Or the facility is in the interior of
the bounding hypercube around the three facilities. Moving
along one coordinate direction towards one agent reduces
the Manhattan distance to this agent, but increases the Man-
hattan distance to at least one of the two other agents. Hence,
the solution is Pareto optimal. ⋄
Theorem 7 For four or more agents in two or more dimen-
sions, there is no anonymous, strategy proof and Pareto opti-
mal mechanism for locating a single facility with Manhattan
distances.
Proof: To show the result for four or more agents in two
or more dimensions, we suppose agents are limited to the
x-y plane. Suppose we have three agents at (0, 2), (1, 0) and
(2, 1) respectively. Consider a mechanism that locates a fa-
cility at the maximum of each coordinate axis. This puts the
facility at (2, 2). This is Pareto dominated by the solution
which locates the facility at (1, 1). Similarly, the mechanism
that locates a facility at the minimum of each coordinate axis
puts the facility at (0, 0). This is also Pareto dominated by
the solution which locates the facility at (1, 1). If we rotate
these three agents 90 degrees, we can also demonstrate that
any mechanism that puts the facility at the maximum of one
coordinate axis and the minimum of the other can return
Pareto dominated solutions.
We now consider a four agent problem made up
of these three agents and one other. By Theorem 2
in (Barber, Gul, and Stacchetti 1993), any strategy proof
mechanism in two dimensions is a coordinate-wise combi-
nation of strategy proof mechanisms. By (Moulin 1980), it
must be a coordinate-wise combination of generalized me-
dian voting schemes. We can shift our original three vot-
ers in the box bounded by (0, 0) and (2, 2) so that they are
well away from any “phantom” voters. Hence, any strat-
egy proof mechanism for our four agents picks out the jth
ranked x-coordinate and the kth ranked y-coordinate for
some j, k ∈ [1, 4]. Suppose j = 1 and k = 2. Then place the
fourth agent at (3, 0). Our strategy proof mechanism then lo-
cates the facility at the minimum x-coordinate and minimum
y-coordinate of the original three agents. That is, it locates
the facility at (0, 0). This is Pareto dominated by the mecha-
nism that locates the facility at (1, 1). Similar constructions
show that any other parameters j and k also return solutions
that are Pareto dominated. Hence, no mechanism for four
agents in two dimensions is anonymous, strategy proof and
Pareto optimal. The proof extends to five or more agents by
placing additional agents at appropriate boundary positions.
⋄
A similar impossibility result for locating multiple facili-
ties in Manhattan space quickly follows: there is no anony-
mous, strategy proof and Pareto optimal mechanism for lo-
catingm uncapacitated facilities (m ≥ 2) andm+3 or more
agents in Manhattan space.
We next consider dropping in turn anonymity, Pareto op-
timality and strategy proofness. If we drop anonymity, there
are multiple mechanisms for locating one or more facili-
ties in Manhattan space that are Pareto optimal and strat-
egy proof but not anonymous. For example, any SD mech-
anism is Pareto optimal and strategy proof but not anony-
mous. Similarly, if we drop Pareto optimality, there are mul-
tiple mechanisms for Manhattan space that are anonymous
and strategy proof but not Pareto optimal (e.g. any multi-
dimensional PERCENTILE mechanismwith parameters pi =
0 for all i). And if we drop strategy proofness, there are mul-
tiple mechanisms that are anonymous and Pareto optimal
but not strategy proof. Consider again the mechanism that
orders agents by x-coordinate, tie-breaking by y-coordinate,
and locates the first facility at the position of the first agent in
this order, and subsequent facilities at the position of the next
agent in the order at a new location. We therefore conclude
that anonymity, Pareto optimality and strategy proofness are
a minimal combination of incompatible axioms for locating
one or more facility in two or more dimensional Manhattan
space.
We end with some discussion about welfare bounds.
In particular, we consider welfare bounds for multi-
dimensional PERCENTILE mechanism when locating one or
more facility in Manhattan space. Recall that such mech-
anisms are anonymous and strategy proof. We suppose
the mechanism chooses axes that align with those used to
compute Manhattan distances. We first observe that lower
bounds on approximation ratios for facility location in Man-
hattan space can be inherited from lower bounds on approx-
imation ratios for facility location on the line (e.g. those
bounds in (Procaccia and Tennenholtz 2013)). Hence, with
a single facility, no deterministic and strategy proof mech-
anism is better than a 2-approximation for the maximum
Manhattan distance. In fact, with a single facility, the multi-
dimensional MEDIAN mechanism is optimal with respect to
both the total and the maximum Manhattan distances. No
deterministic and strategy proof mechanism provides better
approximation ratios.
Theorem 8 The multi-dimensionalMEDIAN mechanism lo-
cates a single facility to minimize the total Manhattan dis-
tance, and to 2-approximate the optimal maximum Manhat-
tan distance.
Proof: With Manhattan distances, the total distance is min-
imized by minimizing each coordinate individually. The
MEDIAN mechanism does this along each coordinate. For
the maximum Manhattan distance, each coordinate at worst
2-approximates its contribution to the overallManhattan dis-
tance. ⋄
When locating more facilities in Manhattan space, ap-
proximation becomes more challenging. In particular, with
two or more uncapacitated facilities in two or more dimen-
sions, no multi-dimensional PERCENTILE mechanism has a
bounded approximation ratio for the total Manhattan dis-
tance (Theorem 4 in (Sui, Boutilier, and Sandholm 2013)).
It follows quickly that no multi-dimensional PERCENTILE
mechanism has a bounded approximation ratio for the maxi-
mumManhattan distance (using the same argument as in the
proof of Theorem 4).
We contrast these results with the 1-d setting. With a
single facility, approximation ratios are the same in 1-d as
2-d Manhattan space. With two facilities on the line, the
ENDPOINT mechanism has bounded approximation ratios
for the total and maximum distances. When we move to
2-d Manhattan space, the approximation ratios become un-
bounded. With three or more facilities, approximation ra-
tios are unbounded whether we are in 1-d or 2-d Manhat-
tan space. In general, moving from 1-d to 2-d Manhattan
space, tends to increase approximation ratios for the total
or maximum distance. We also contrast results for Man-
hattan space with those for Euclidean space. With a sin-
gle facility, the 2-dimensional MEDIAN mechanism is op-
timal with respect to the total Manhattan distance but is just
a
√
2-approximation of the optimal Euclidean distance. In
other settings we observe similar approximation ratios for
Manhattan as Euclidean distances (e.g. with two or more
facilities and multi-dimensional PERCENTILE mechanisms,
approximation ratios are unbounded in both Euclidean and
Manhattan space).
Other Mechanisms for Multiple Facilities
A number of specific mechanisms have been proposed with
good axiomatic properties that will locate multiple facili-
ties in two or higher dimensional space. With two facilities
and any type of metric space, Lu et al. prove that the ran-
domized PROPORTIONAL mechanism is strategy proof and
4-approximates the total distance (?). With three or more
facilities, they note that this mechanism is no longer strat-
egy proof. With any fixed number m of facilities (m ≥ 1)
and any type of metric space, Fotakis and Tzamos prove that
the winner imposing version of the PROPORTIONAL mech-
anism is strategy proof and achieves an approximation ra-
tio for the total distance of at most 4m (Fotakis and Tzamos
2010). Finally, with n−1 facilities and n agents and any type
of metric space, Escoffier et al. prove that the randomized
INVERSELYPROPORTIONAL mechanism is strategy proof
and an n/2-approximation for the total distance and an n-
approximation for the maximum distance (Escoffier et al.
2011).
Conclusions
We have studied the impact on strategy proof mechanisms
for facility location when moving from one dimension to
two (or more) dimensions with Euclidean or Manhattan dis-
tances. We considered two additional axiomatic properties:
anonymity which is a fundamental fairness property, and
Pareto optimality which is a fundamental efficiency prop-
erty. We also consider how well such mechanisms can ap-
proximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat
negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) di-
mensions often makes these axiomatic properties more dif-
ficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Eu-
clidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan
space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and
strategy proof. By contrast, in one dimension when locat-
ing up to two facilities on the line, there exists mechanisms
that are anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. As
a second example, with two facilities in Euclidean space
no PERCENTILE mechanism has a bounded approxima-
tion ratio for the total or maximum distance. By contrast,
when locating up to two facilities on the line, there exists
PERCENTILE mechanisms that bound these approximation
ratios. Indeed, such mechanisms can have optimal approx-
imation ratios. All our impossibility results are minimal. If
we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto opti-
mality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy
the other two axioms. For example, when locating two fa-
cilities in Euclidean space, there exist multiple mechanisms
that are anonymous and Pareto optimal, that are anonymous
and strategy proof, and that are Pareto optimal and strategy
proof.
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